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THE HUMAN FACTOR: GLOBALIZING ETHICAL
STANDARDS IN DRUG TRIALS THROUGH
MARKET EXCLUSION
Fazal Khan*
INTRODUCTION
She was only ten years old and suffering from bacterial meningitis, a
serious infectious disease that was sweeping through West Africa.'
Meningitis attacks the protective membranes covering the brain and
spinal cord and can cause serious neurologic damage or even death. 2
The good news for the girl and her family was that there was an effec-
tive treatment for this disease: intravenous (IV) antibiotics. 3 Further,
once they arrived at the clinic in Kano, Nigeria, they met Western
doctors in white coats offering free drugs.4 However, three days later,
the girl died; she had not received proven antibiotic therapy, but only
an experimental drug called Trovan.5 The girl's family-along with
many others-later claimed that, instead of receiving medical care,
they were unwittingly participating in a multinational drug company's
experimental trial that led to the serious impairment or death of many
children. 6 Why would a drug company do something like this? If data
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1. See Joe Stephens, Where Profits and Lives Hang in Balance, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2000, at
Al. The Washington Post published a six-part series entitled The Body Hunters, which examined
the growing phenomenon of international clinical drug testing, highlighting the system's ten-
dency to exploit the poor and uneducated while betraying promises of safety and effectiveness to
patients and consumers. This article was the first of the series.
2. See World Health Org., Meningococcal Meningitis, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/fact-
sheets/fsl41/en/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
3. See Stephens, supra note 1.
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. (Abdullahi I), No. 01-Civ.-8118, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436, at
*1-8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2002).
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from the experiment helped the drug obtain market approval and it
became a blockbuster, this company would have over a billion
reasons.
7
Given the tremendous financial reward that a blockbuster therapy
might generate, there are strong incentives to move drug research and
development to developing countries, which have minimal ethical
guidelines and little transparency.8 The danger in this race for the
prize-or for the bottom-is the exploitation of subaltern populations
that have little legal recourse to hold drug companies accountable for
the harm that those populations suffer as a result of unethical clinical
trials. 9 In other words, the drug industry is acutely aware that there is
a minimal threat of costly civil suits and criminal sanctions for their
ethical violations in impoverished countries. The result is that it has
become an industry practice to relax international ethical norms for
drug trials in developing countries.' 0 This does not mean that drug
companies are inherently unethical institutions-these corporations
are composed of persons who are simply being human and responding
to structural incentives. Additionally, the statistics derived from these
clinical trials represent actual human individuals, who are also re-
sponding to the structural incentives that exist for them: a promise of
healthcare only if they submit to risky experiments.
This Article is part one of a two-part series that seeks to deter un-
ethical clinical drug trials in developing nations by preventing unethi-
7. Stephens, supra note 1 (noting Wall Street analysts' projections that Trovan would be a $1
billion drug if approved for all of its potential uses).
8. The term "developing countries" is used here to denote countries with relatively low stan-
dards of living and undeveloped infrastructures. See U.S. Dep't of State, International Informa-
tion Programs Glossary, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/trade/glossdi.htm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2008). This term has largely replaced the use of "third world" to describe simi-
larly situated nations. See ROBERT O'BRIEN & MARC WILLIAMS, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECON-
OMY: EVOLUTION AND DYNAMICS 258 (2004).
9. The term "subaltern" is used here in the Gramscian sense to denote marginalized individu-
als or groups that do not possess agency as a consequence of their social status. See SELECrIONS
FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI 52-55 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey
Nowell Smith eds. & trans., 1971).
10. See David M. Kent et al., Clinical Trials in Sub-Saharan Africa and Established Standards
of Care: A Systematic Review of HIV, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Trials, 292 JAMA 237, 239
(2004) (looking at compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki's "best current" therapeutic stan-
dard and finding that only 16% of selected trials met this standard, despite 81% of the trials
reporting oversight by an ethics review board). Abdullahi I presented just one example of this
relaxation of ethics. Although the Abdullahi I court took the facts alleged by the plaintiffs in the
complaint as true for purposes of the motions before it, see Abdullahi 1, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17436, at *8, the alleged facts have been corroborated by independent witnesses in a variety of
press accounts and legal journal articles. See, e.g., Sarah Boseley, New Drug 'Illegally Tested on
Children': Pfizer Accused of Irregularities During Clinical Trial in Nigeria, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Jan. 17, 2001, at 19; Stephens, supra note 1.
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cally developed products from gaining market approval." In
particular, this Article argues for a combination of soft-law tech-
niques, including more robust and subaltern-centric surveillance of in-
ternational drug trials, and hard-law rules within the regulatory
agencies of the United States and the European Union (EU) that re-
quire clinical drug research to adhere to international ethical stan-
dards. The intended result would be a stiff economic penalty:
exclusion from lucrative markets. This in turn would create a strong
ex ante economic incentive for drug companies to ethically conduct
drug trials. 12
First, this Article outlines how the international community's cur-
rent medical ethics regime has emerged as a reaction to historical ethi-
cal abuses.13 Next, it addresses how globalization has transformed
human drug-testing trials and, in the process, has rendered inadequate
the current ethics regime, which does not operate well across interna-
tional borders into developing nations.14 Finally, this Article de-
scribes how soft law, which can work effectively across international
borders, can be used to effectuate hard-law sanctions, such as blocking
market approval within the United States and the EU, to deter uneth-
ical practices in clinical drug trials. 15
II. EXORCISING HISTORY'S DEMONS: THE GENESIS OF
CURRENT ETHICAL NORMS
This Part explains how the development of international bioethical
guidelines has largely been a narrative of society's reaction to medical
and scientific transgressions after the fact. In particular, it describes
three of the most prominent statements on bioethics: the Nuremberg
11. The second part of this two-part series proposes stripping pharmaceutical companies' in-
tellectual property rights for drugs that are developed unethically not only to serve as an addi-
tional deterrent, but to also address the social cost issue that arises if a medically beneficial drug
is excluded from the market.
12. In a sense, this proposal operates almost like the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
from U.S. jurisprudence. This doctrine makes evidence obtained with the help of illegally gath-
ered information inadmissible. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963).
The logic of this doctrine is that if the source of the evidence (the "tree") is tainted, then any-
thing gained from the tree (the "fruit") is likewise tainted. See id. To remove the incentive for
illegal searches and to ultimately deter such behavior, the tainted information is generally inad-
missible in court. See id.
13. See infra notes 16-90 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 91-169 and accompanying text. See also Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. (Abdul-
lahi I//), No. 01-Civ.-8118, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16126 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005) (dismissing
class-action plaintiffs' case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute
and forum non conveniens); Kent, supra note 10.
15. See infra notes 170-238 and accompanying text.
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Code, 16 the World Medical Association's Declaration of Helsinki, 17
and the Belmont Report.18 Finally, this Part explains how these ethi-
cal standards are applied to human clinical trials by drug regulatory
agencies. 19
A. The Nuremberg Code: Reacting to Nazi Horrors
Modern bioethics, in the form of the Nuremberg Code (the
"Code"), arose as a strong reaction to the horrific Nazi medical exper-
iments of World War II. The sheer inhumanity of these experiments
became public record immediately after World War II during the Nu-
remberg Trials. 20 These experiments were invariably performed on
prisoners in concentration camps and not on volunteers affiliated with
the German military or the Nazi party.21 The purported rationales for
these experiments ranged from advancing medical and military knowl-
edge to proving pseudoscientific racist theories. 22 In one of the "mili-
tary" experiments, Dr. Sigmund Rascher placed prisoners in a
decompression chamber to determine the best means of rescuing pi-
lots who had to abandon their planes at high altitudes, where there
was little oxygen and low atmospheric pressure. 23 Rascher would
often dissect victims' brains-some while they were still alive-"to
show that high altitude sickness [was caused by] the formation of tiny
air bubbles in the blood vessels [in a particular part] of the brain. ''24
In a trial to discover how long downed German pilots could survive in
16. See infra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 38-67 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 68-90 and accompanying text.
20. Sharona Hoffman, Beneficial and Unusual Punishment: An Argument in Support of Pris-
oner Participation in Clinical Trials, 33 IND. L. REV. 475, 483 (2000). The Japanese military also
tested biowarfare agents on unwitting Chinese subjects in occupied Manchuria by spraying infec-
tious diseases over populated areas and infecting well-water and other foodstuffs, and then ex-
amining the rate of disease and effect on the Chinese population. See id. Unlike the Nuremberg
Trials, no international war crimes tribunal was held for these Japanese experiments, because the
U.S. military was interested in the results for its own biowarfare program and granted the Japa-
nese scientists immunity in exchange for shared research findings. See Ralph Blumenthal with
Judith Miller, Japan Rebuffs Requests for Information About Its Germ-Warfare Atrocities, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1999, at A12.
21. See Hoffman, supra note 20, at 483.
22. U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Nazi Medical Experiments, HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPE-
DIA, available at http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang=EN&Moduleld=10005168 (last vis-
ited Feb. 12, 2008).
23. Transcript of Medical Trial at 207-09, Nuremberg War Trials (Dec. 11, 1946), available at
http://nuremberg.law.harvard.edu/NurTranscript!TranscriptPages (follow links to specific page
numbers).
24. Peter Tyson, The Experiments, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/novaholocaust/ex-
periside.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
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the frigid North Sea, Rascher immersed prisoners in ice water tanks
for varying amounts of time and then attempted to revive them using
different warming methods. 25 Naturally, many of these prisoners died
of hypothermia. Other Nazi trials subjected prisoners to the effects of
sea water, toxic gas, bone transplantation, sterilization, and various
infectious diseases. 26 At the conclusion of the Nuremberg trials,
twenty-three Nazi doctors were convicted of committing "war crimes
and crimes against humanity," and seven of those doctors were exe-
cuted for their actions.27
The lasting legacy of this tribunal is the Code, which, for the first
time, set out an international consensus statement of what constituted
ethical treatment of humans in clinical trials. 28 The Code contains ten
points that elucidate the circumstances where human medical experi-
mentation is ethical and permissible. 29 The first line of the Code
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Hoffman, supra note 20, at 483.
28. See Robert J. Levine, New International Ethical Guidelines for Research Involving Human
Subjects, 119 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 339 (1993).
29. The ten points of the Code are found as follows:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent;
should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the
intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other
ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and
comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to
make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that
before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there
should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment;
the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and
hazards reasonable to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which
may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon
each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a personal
duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society,
unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary
in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal experi-
mentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem
under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the
experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and
mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe that
death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where the
experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
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states that "[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential. ' 30 Moreover, the Code's core is that testing on human sub-
jects can only be done if test participants give voluntary and informed
consent.31 In other words, human subjects cannot be coerced into par-
ticipating in experiments or be kept ignorant of the risks to which they
will be exposed.
B. Declaration of Helsinki: Tempering the Nuremberg Code
The World Medical Association (WMA) describes itself as an
"apolitical" organization that "has (and indeed seeks to have) no ac-
tual powers, yet the Declarations and Statements it has made over the
years have carried great weight in national and international de-
bates. '32 Indeed, the WMA's Declaration of Helsinki (the "Declara-
tion") "has been described as 'the fundamental document in the field
of ethics in biomedical research.' "33 In the years following the Code's
issuance, many medical researchers complained that its absolutist
stance on informed consent was archaic and "a product of and reac-
tion to Nazi terror ...no longer useful for todays's researchers. '34
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humani-
tarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect the
experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons. The
highest degree of skill and care should be required through all stages of the experi-
ment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring
the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where con-
tinuation of the experiment seems to him to be impossible.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to
terminate the experiment at any stage. if he has probable cause to believe, in the
exercise of the good faith, superior skill and careful judgment required of him that
a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to
the experimental subject.
HORST H. FREYHOFER, THE NUREMBERG MEDICAL TRIAL: THE HOLOCAUST AND THE ORIGIN
OF THE NUREMBERG MEDICAL CODE 103-04 (2004) (quoting the Code).
30. Id. at 103.
31. See id. at 103-04.
32. World Med. Ass'n. Policy: Introduction and History, http://www.wma.net/e/policy/index.
htm (last visited Feb. 12. 2008). The WMA is often confused with the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO).
33. Lori A. Alvino, Note, Who's Watching the Watchdogs? Responding to the Erosion of Re-
search Ethics by Enforcing Promises, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 896 (2003) (quoting INTERNA-
TIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 9
(1993)).
34. William DuBois, Note. New Drug Research, The Extraterritorial Application of FDA Reg-
ulations, and the Need for International Cooperation, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 161, 203 (2003)
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Further, the Code only focused on nontherapeutic research and did
not focus on the broad field of therapeutic research, where there is
some promise of benefit to the subjects-such as an experimental can-
cer drug shown to be effective in animals that is later taken by a per-
son with cancer.
Drafted in 1964, the Declaration "set[s] forth a list of duties and
responsibilities that are expected of all physicians taking part in exper-
imental research on humans. '35 Implicitly recognizing the Code as
the signature text on bioethics, the Declaration addresses researchers'
criticisms by not requiring consent for therapeutic research "where
the researcher believes that it is unnecessary or difficult to obtain"
and allowing for proxy consent, such as through a legal guardian or a
community leader.36 However, with the exception of the consent re-
quirements, the Declaration generally follows the contours set forth
by the Code, and its stated purpose is to have medical researchers
"put their patients' interest first. ' 37
C. The Belmont Report: Awakening to American Abuses
The publicized horrors of Nazi experiments on persons with no
agency led to a profound rethinking about scientific research on
human subjects. Since World War II, almost no country has sanc-
tioned the use of prisoners in clinical trials with one major exception:
the United States.38 The United States has a long history of con-
ducting clinical trials on prisoners that preceded, and continued long
after, the Nuremberg Trials. In fact, during the Nuremberg Trials, de-
fense attorneys futilely argued that the Nazi physicians' actions were
tantamount to "the wartime experiments in the United States such as
those carried out at the Joliet, Illinois[ ] prison in which treatments for
malaria were sought by physicians who had to first infect the volun-
(quoting Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and the Ethics
of Autonomy, 36 CATH. LAW. 455, 471-72 (1996)).
35. David M. Carr, Note, Pfizer's Epidemic: A Need for International Regulation of Human
Experimentation in Developing Countries, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 15, 22 (2003).
36. Finnuala Kelleher, Note, The Pharmaceutical Industry's Responsibility for Protecting
Human Subjects of Clinical Trials in Developing Nations, 38 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 67, 74
(2004).
37. World Med. Ass'n, supra note 32.
38. Members of the dissident Chinese group Falun Gong have repeatedly alleged that the
Chinese government has performed organ harvesting procedures on some of their imprisoned
members. The Chinese government denies these allegations but has a less than stellar human
rights record. See China Harvesting Falun Gong Organs, Report Alleges, CBC NEWS, July 6,
2006, available at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/07/06/china-falungong.html.
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teer prisoners with the disease. ' 39 The U.S. military also experi-
mented on prisoners for research involving dengue fever, sleeping
sickness, and sand-fly fever.40 Further, the U.S. military and the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency have a long history of testing psychoactive
drugs on enlisted soldiers without informing them that they were be-
ing used as guinea pigs. 41 Following World War 1I, it was the pharma-
ceutical industry, rather than the military, that conducted most of the
clinical trials involving prisoners. In fact, by 1969, 85% of new drugs
were tested on prisoners in over forty prison research facilities across
the United States.42
Perhaps the most infamous breach of medical ethics in the United
States is the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, notorious for its audacity, scope,
and persistence into the post-Civil Rights Era.43 This study was con-
ducted between 1932 and 1972 on hundreds of impoverished African
American men, who were promised free medical care for participating
in the trial.44 After penicillin was proven to be an effective treatment
for syphilis in 1947, the researchers had no justifiable reason to con-
tinue the trial. 45 However, the Tuskegee researchers received federal
approval to amend and continue their study by willfully denying treat-
ment to their subjects so that they could observe the natural course of
untreated syphilis.46
39. Hoffman, supra note 20, at 483 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). This
argument failed as the prosecution pressed that the Nazi victims had no choice whether to par-
ticipate in the experiments, "and in the United States prisoners volunteered to participate in
clinical trials." Id. Clearly the circumstances facing Nazi concentration camp prisoners and U.S.
prisoners during World War II are incomparable, but one can certainly question whether U.S.
prisoners had adequate agency to genuinely volunteer for the trials.
40. Id. at 482.
41. Id. at 485-86; see also Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146, 1148-53 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar. 1981)
(holding that sovereign immunity barred a serviceman's claim that U.S. officials repeatedly gave
him LSD without his knowledge when he volunteered for a military chemical warfare testing
program). Several terrorism suspects that were held in Guantanamo Bay have alleged that U.S.
military personnel performed medical experiments on them, perhaps demonstrating that the les-
sons of the Nuremberg Medical Trials have been forgotten. See, e.g., Laure Bretton, Frenchmen
Say Guantanamo Detention Was Like Hell, REUTERS, July 30, 2004, available at http://www.com-
mondreams.org/headlinesO4/0730-07.htm.
42. Hoffman, supra note 20, at 486.
43. See Howard Wolinsky, Steps Still Being Taken To Undo Damage of "America's Nurem-
berg," 127 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1-43 (Aug. 15, 1997) (citing ARTHUR CAPLAN, WHEN
MEDICINE WENT MAD: BIOETHICS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1992)). The Civil Rights Era is gen-
erally recognized as occurring from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s. See JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON
THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RicHTrs YEARS 1954-1965 (1987).
44. See Wolinsky, supra note 43, at 1-43 to 1-44.
45. Id. at 1-43.
46. See id. Even the flimsy rationale of scientific curiosity is hard to accept as a justification
because the natural course of syphilis is well known. Frederic Nietzche, Vincent Van Gogh, and
Abraham Lincoln have famously been alleged to have suffered from the end stages of syphilis.
[Vol. 57:877
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During the latter half of the twentieth century, other medical trials
stood out for their brazen disregard of the human subjects involved.
In the 1960s, researchers at Willowbrook State Hospital, a facility for
"mentally defective children," studied hepatitis by deliberately in-
fecting children who were mentally retarded. 47 The children were ei-
ther fed extracts of stool from infected children or directly injected
with the virus. 48 While this study was ongoing, Willowbrook stopped
accepting new residents due to overcrowding. 49 However, because the
hepatitis program was granted its own space in the facility, it still had
capacity to admit new patients.50 Therefore, in some instances, the
hospital would not admit children unless their parents consented to
their children's participation in the study. 51 In another notorious ex-
periment in the 1960s, researchers at the Brooklyn Jewish Chronic
Disease Hospital injected live cancer cells into "indigent, chronically
ill, and debilitated elderly patients" to observe their immunological
responses.52
Taken as a whole, these trials all share certain characteristics. First,
the experimental subjects or their guardians were never properly in-
formed of the experiments' risks. Second, the research did not prom-
ise any therapeutic benefit to the subjects. Third, and most telling,
medical researchers were aware that the subjects lacked the same
agency as fully empowered American adults because of the subjects'
social and physical status. Therefore, these subjects could be ex-
ploited for the sake of scientific progress with little worry that they
had enough power to hold the researchers accountable for practices to
which the researchers themselves undoubtedly would not consent. 53
See Laura McGough, Review of Pox: Genius, Madness, and the Mysteries of Syphilis, 78 BULL.
HIST. MED. 493 (2004) (book review).
47. CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN
SUBJECTS 39 (2005). Experimentation on mentally challenged children has a long and troubling
history in the United States. During the 1940s and 1950s, the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy and Quaker Oats fed radioactive iron to boys classified as "mentally retarded" to measure
the effect of a cereal-heavy diet on mineral absorption. MIT, Quaker Oats to Settle Radiation
Experiment Suit, CNN, Dec. 31, 1997, http://www.cnn.com/US/9712/31/radioactive.oatmealU. The
boys, aged twelve to seventeen, were duped into thinking they were joining a "science club." Id.
In addition to radioactive materials, "club members" were treated with extra portions of milk
and trips to baseball games and the beach. Id. Parents of the boys were not told that the study
involved radioactive materials or that there would be any risks. Id. In 1997, MIT and Quaker
Oats agreed to pay victims of this experiment $1.85 million. Id.
48. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 39.
49. Id. at 40.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 39.
53. Provision five of the Code states that certain risky experiments are allowable if the re-
searchers would subject themselves to the same risks as the subjects. FREYHOFER, supra note 29,
2008]
886 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:877
Public outrage over the Tuskegee trial, coupled with the general so-
cial tumult of the early 1970s, forced Congress to take a stronger role
in overseeing human clinical trials in the United States.5 4 In 1974,
Congress passed the National Research Act.55 Pursuant to this act,
the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in Bi-
omedical and Behavioral Research (the "Commission") was estab-
lished. 56 Increased scrutiny of prison testing facilities revealed
evidence of coercion, lack of informed consent, and unreported ad-
verse health outcomes.57 As a consequence, in 1976, the Commission
recommended a federal "moratorium on funding and approving pris-
oner studies" until research criteria that protected the prisoners' inter-
ests could be drafted.58 In 1979, building upon the Code and the
Declaration, the Commission issued the Belmont Report as the U.S.
government's official policy statement regarding research on human
subjects. 59
The core principles of the Belmont Report are respect for persons,
beneficence, and justice. 60  The respect for persons principle rein-
forces the concept of informed consent and requires that "subjects
enter into research voluntarily and with adequate information. '61
This principle applies special scrutiny to experiments on those with
at 104. This type of provision is not reproduced in the Belmont Report or the Declaration, but
clearly demonstrates that the Code authors were concerned with the different strata of power
usually occupied by researchers and subjects and that perhaps one check on abuse of this power
differential is a requirement that researchers be willing to subject themselves to the same risk as
their subjects.
54. Hoffman, supra note 20, at 488.
55. Id.; National Research Act, Pub. L. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
56. Hoffman, supra note 20, at 488.
57. See id. at 488-90.
58. Id. at 488. The Commission's recommendations included Institutional Review Boards
(IRBs) for prison experiments. Id. at 489. The use of inmates raised concerns not present when
research subjects came from the general public. See id. For instance, an IRB would institute
safeguards "to ensure that the advantages that the prisoners enjoy[ed] through participation in
the trial with respect to living conditions, healthcare, food, amenities, and potential earnings
[were] not so great to render the inmate unable to weigh the risks of the study against its benefits
in the prison environment." Id. Further, the risks from the trial had to be equivalent to those
acceptable to nonincarcerated research subjects, and participation in research trials could not be
considered when making parole decisions. Id. at 490.
59. See BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTEC-
TION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192
(Apr. 18, 1979). See also Alvino, supra note 33, at 895-96 ("The federal regulations that cur-
rently govern federally funded research involving human subjects have their origins in two inter-
national codes: the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki.").
60. BELMONT REPORT, 44 Fed. Reg. at 23,192-93.
61. Id. at 23,194.
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diminished autonomy, such as children, those with mental handicaps,
and prisoners. 62 The principle of beneficence requires that the poten-
tial risks to research subjects are balanced against the potential bene-
fits to society and mandates that research studies can only proceed if
the benefits outweigh the risks.63 The principle of justice requires fair-
ness in the distribution of research benefits and burdens among differ-
ent populations.64 Thus, this principle prevents one group from
bearing all of the risks and receiving none of the benefits from re-
search, while another group receives all of the benefits but bears none
of the risks.65
Pursuant to the National Research Act, the Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS) instituted regulations governing human
research that became known as the "Common Rule. ' 66 The Common
Rule requires that all institutions receiving federal funds for research
using human subjects must establish Institutional Review Boards
(IRBs) to oversee all human research and ensure compliance with
DHHS regulations. 67 Thus, primarily IRBs implement the principles
of the Belmont Report.
D. Applicability of Ethical Guidelines to Globalized Trials
There are a variety of international ethical guidelines that purport
to regulate foreign drug trials. These include regulations from the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the EU, and the World Health
Organization (WHO). The texts of these guidelines have few faults.
However, in practice, they are spottily enforced and fail to provide
adequate protection to vulnerable research populations in developing
countries.
1. FDA Regulations and the Declaration of Helsinki
The globalization of clinical trials truly went into effect after a 1980
FDA ruling that allowed data from foreign trials to be used in new
drug applications (NDAs). 68 The FDA intended for the rule change
to reduce duplicative trials and shorten the time required to bring new
62. Id. at 23,193.
63. Id. at 23,194.
64. Id.
65. The justice principle is clearly being violated in many of the drug trials taking place in
developing nations, as the groups bearing all of the risks are not the intended market for the
drug makers and likely cannot afford new drugs with patent protection.
66. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 106.
67. Id. at 106-07.
68. See Mary Flaherty et al., Testing Tidal Wave Hits Overseas, WASH. POSr, Dec. 18, 2000, at
Al (article two of the Body Hunters series).
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drugs to the market.69 However, because the FDA is charged with
ensuring that new drugs are both safe and efficacious, it still has the
responsibility to validate data submitted by foreign trials.70 Thus, for
foreign data submitted in NDAs, the FDA requires disclosure or ac-
cess to the clinical investigators, research facilities, study protocols,
and individual patient records. 7'
One could argue that the FDA's effort to ensure the scientific integ-
rity of clinical trial data bears little relation to the "safety of human
test subjects. ' ' 72 Given the FDA's mandate to ensure the safety and
efficacy of drugs, it does not appear to have an administrative ratio-
nale for protecting the rights of foreign test subjects. For instance, the
safety of U.S. consumers would not be implicated if there were a lack
of consent among foreign test subjects, so long as the data demon-
strating safety were valid. Similarly, the efficacy of a drug would not
be implicated under the scenario described above. However, by stat-
ute, the FDA purports to enforce ethical standards for clinical data
used to support an NDA.73
There are two different pathways for studies to be accepted under
FDA guidelines. On the one hand, a drug company can file an Inves-
tigational New Drug Application (INDA), which has the effect of
"bringing the investigator, regardless of the location of the research,
under the federal [research] regulations. ' 74 On the other hand, if a
drug company chooses not to take the INDA pathway, thus avoiding
direct FDA regulation, the studies used to support an NDA must still
satisfy either the Declaration's guidelines or the regulations of the
country where the research was conducted, "whichever represents the
greater protection of the individual. ' 75 The FDA regulations make
further demands:
69. See Julie C. Relihan, Note, Expediting FDA Approval of AIDS Drugs: An International
Approach, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 229, 251 (1995):
In 1984, the FDA revised its policy regarding the use of foreign clinical data in response
to pressure from private industry groups, foreign governments, and rising scientific
standards. The FDA recognized that the unnecessary repetition of clinical studies
might contribute to the length of its approval process, and that foreign clinical studies
had begun to produce higher quality clinical data.
Id.
70. See DuBois, supra note 34, at 193-94.
71. 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(b) (2007).
72. DuBois, supra note 34, at 194.
73. See id. at 193-94.
74. Erin Talati, Comment, An Open Door to Ending Exploitation: Accountability for Viola-
tions of Informed Consent Under the Alien Tort Statute, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 231, 240 (2006)
(emphasis omitted).
75. 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(c)(1).
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For each foreign clinical study submitted under this section, the
sponsor shall explain how the research conformed to the ethical
principles contained in the "Declaration of Helsinki" or the foreign
country's standards, whichever were used. If the foreign country's
standards were used, the sponsor shall explain in detail how those
standards differ from the "Declaration of Helsinki" and how they
offer greater protection.76
At least in theory, under this FDA regulation, there should not be a
race to the bottom problem as an underdeveloped country's lax stan-
dards would automatically be upgraded to the Declaration's
standards.
2. Umbrella of International Ethical Guidelines
The majority of EU countries have adopted the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and Biomedicine (CHRB), which imposes le-
gally binding rules on those countries that have enacted it.v7 Article 5
of the CHRB provides the following regarding informed consent:
"An intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the
person concerned has given free and informed consent to it. This per-
son shall beforehand be given appropriate information as to the pur-
pose and nature of the intervention as well as on its consequences and
risks."'7 8 More specifically, Article 16 provides that clinical human re-
search can only take place if "the persons undergoing research have
been informed of their rights and the safeguards prescribed by law for
their protection ... [and] the necessary consent as provided for under
article 5 has been given expressly, specifically and is documented. '7 9
Furthermore, "[s]uch consent may be freely withdrawn at any time."80
Not surprisingly, these specific CHRB provisions mirror the Declara-
tion's requirements.
In 1989, serious plans for the creation of a global pharmaceutical
regulator began to develop at the WHO Conference of Drug Regula-
tory Authorities.81 The following year, the International Conference
on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) was born. 2 The ICH is a col-
laborative effort between representatives of regulatory bodies and the
76. § 312.120(c)(2).
77. Talati, supra note 74, at 265.
78. Council of Europe: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and Explanatory Re-
port ch. II, art. 5, Apr. 4, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 817, 821 [hereinafter CHRB].
79. CHRB, ch. V, art. 16, 36 I.L.M. 817, 822.
80. Id.
81. ICH, http://www.ich.org/cache/compo/276-254-1.html (follow "History and Future Hyper-
link") (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
82. Id. This conception is described as follows:
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drug industry to develop common protocols and regulations for ensur-
ing the safety, efficacy, and testing of drugs.83 Initially, the ICH con-
sisted primarily of representatives from the United States, Western
Europe, and Japan, but it now includes observers from the WHO,
which provides linkage with other regions of the globe.84 The ICH
has established ethical guidelines constituting good clinical practices
in the conduct of clinical human research that meet the FDA's foreign
trial requirement by at least meeting the Declaration's standards. 85
The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences
(CIOMS) is a long-standing nongovernmental organization (NGO)
created under the auspices of the WHO.86 Since the 1970s, one of the
CIOMS's missions has been to "indicate how the ethical principles
that should guide the conduct of biomedical research involving human
subjects, as set forth in the Declaration of Helsinki, could be effec-
tively applied, particularly in developing countries, given their socio-
economic circumstances, laws and regulations, and executive and
administrative arrangements. ' 87 Recent CIOMS ethical guidelines,
directed particularly at clinical trials "carried out in low resource
countries," call for the standards outlined in the Belmont Report: re-
spect for persons, beneficence, and justice.88
Harmonisation of regulatory requirements was pioneered by the European Commu-
nity, in the 1980s, as the EC (now the European Union) moved towards the develop-
ment of a single market for pharmaceuticals. The success achieved in Europe
demonstrated that harmonisation was feasible. At the same time there were bilateral
discussions between Europe, Japan and the US on possibilities for harmonisation. It
was, however, at the WHO Conference of Drug Regulatory Authorities (ICDRA), in
Paris, in 1989, that specific plans for action began to materialise. Soon afterwards, the
authorities approached IFPMA to discuss a joint regulatory-industry initiative on inter-
national harmonisation, and ICH was conceived.
The birth of ICH took place at a meeting in April 1990, hosted by the EFPIA in
Brussels. Representatives of the regulatory agencies and industry associations of Eu-
rope, Japan and the USA met, primarily, to plan an International Conference but the
meeting also discussed the wider implications and terms of reference of ICH.
Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. For instance, the ICH provides the following guidelines for informed consent:
[Informed consent is a] process by which a subject voluntarily confirms his or her will-
ingness to participate in a particular trial, after having been informed of all aspects of
the trial that are relevant to the subject's decision to participate. Informed consent is
documented by means of a written, signed and dated informed consent form.
ICH HARMONISED TRIPARTITE GUIDELINE: GUIDELINE FOR GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE
E6(R1) (June 10, 1996), available at http://www.ich.org/LOB/media/MEDIA482.pdf.
86. CIOMS, INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING
HUMAN SUBJECTS (2002), available at http://www.cioms.ch/frame-guidelines nov_2002.htm.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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3. International Ethical Guidelines without an "International" Effect
Taken as a whole, the FDA, CHRB, ICH, and CIOMS regulations
demand ethical practices that are at least as robust as the Declara-
tion's standards, no matter where a clinical trial takes place. The
question then becomes whether this host of ethical regulations and
guidelines actually causes researchers to meet ethical standards in for-
eign clinical trials. The empirical evidence is discouraging. A recent
study that focused on compliance with the "best current" therapeutic
efforts standard of the Declaration in sub-Saharan African clinical tri-
als found that only 16% of studies satisfied the requirement.8 9 As a
practical matter, in the event that the FDA does conduct any oversight
of foreign testing, the oversight usually occurs after the trials are com-
plete;90 thus, there is no observation of the methods that were used to
protect research participants. In other words, the United States's, the
EU's, and Japan's drug regulatory agencies' practice of accepting for-
eign trials opened the door to the vast expansion of globalized trials,
but without a de facto expansion of globalized ethical protections.
III. THE BODY TRADE: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
HUMAN CLINICAL RESEARCH
The market forces driving pharmaceutical companies to move their
human experimentation to poorer nations are clear. The traditional
model was for the industry to acquire test subjects and conduct trials
through academic medical institutions. However, with an explosion of
experimental drugs in their pipeline, companies found this traditional
model too costly and time-consuming. By moving drug trials overseas
and outsourcing more of their testing to contract research organiza-
tions (CROs), the pharmaceutical industry has found a business
formula that provides them easier access to test subjects, with the
promise of lower costs and quicker time to market for new drugs.
A. Drugs, Drugs, Everywhere, Nor Any Drop of Profit?
Advances in biotechnology, such as gene mapping and 3D modeling
of protein structures, have led to a vast increase in experimental com-
pounds that may prove to be beneficial for a variety of diseases. 91
Market valuation of pharmaceutical companies depends not only on
89. Kent, supra note 10, at 239.
90. See DuBois, supra note 34, at 193-94.
91. See Barry Hochfelder, Speeding Up Drug Discovery with Imaging, ADVANCED IMAGING,
(Sept. 2007), available at http://www.advancedimagingpro.com/print/Advanced-Imaging-Maga-
zine/Speeding-Up-Drug-Discovery-with-Imaging/1$4503. Hochfelder provided the following
example:
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existing sales of approved drugs, but also on the pipeline of experi-
mental drugs that look promising based on preliminary tissue culture
and animal testing.92 In order to extract value from this pipeline,
companies must perform human clinical trials to obtain market ap-
proval from drug regulatory agencies. The initial Phase 1 studies are
small and test a new drug's safety.93 The moderately larger Phase 2
trials look for evidence of effectiveness. 94 Finally, the large Phase 3
trials must statistically prove effectiveness-it is only after this event
that drug companies can expect to profit from their research efforts.95
According to industry estimates, in order to bring a single drug to
market, a company has to enroll "more than 4,000 human subjects
[who will] undergo 141 medical procedures each in more than [sixty-
five] separate trials."'96 Further, clinical investigators have to entice
more than 100,000 persons to enroll in the initial screenings for such
trials, "as only [a small percentage will] show up for their appoint-
ments," and of those who do show up, only a small portion will be
medically eligible. 97 Compounding this herculean task is the fact that
American and European patients are more risk averse than previous
generations and are less willing to submit to such trials.98
In 1954 and 1955, American parents volunteered their children as
"Polio Pioneers" by the tens of thousands, which meant that they were
"guinea pigs" for Jonas Salk's new and unproven polio vaccine.99
When the results of the massive polio trial were released in 1955, the
public euphoria that ensued in the United States was similar to the
response to winning World War 11.100 However, when an improperly
made batch of the vaccine later caused over two hundred polio infec-
tions, the previously unquestioned support for this public health effort
[R]esearchers are using 3D modeling in an effort to identify small molecules that can
be used as anti-cancer agents or as antiviral inhibitors for HIV, influenza and SARS,
among other diseases.
The method is called computational drug design (often called structure-based or ra-
tional design). A computer is used to model how drugs interact with their targets-
usually proteins. It's done at the molecular level in 3D.
Id.
92. See SONIA SHAH, THE BODY HUNTERS: TESTING NEW DRUGS ON THE WORLD'S POOREST
PATIENTS 3 (2006).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See SHAH, sufira note 92, at 4; Flaherty et al., supra note 68.
99. LAURIE GARRETr, BETRAYAL OF TRUST: THE COLLAPSE OF GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH
329 (2000).
100. Id.
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vanished. 10 Additionally, revelations in the following decades of hid-
den risks and unethical practices in medical researchers' experi-
ments'0 2 further solidified public aversion to clinical experiments in
the United States.10 3 Indeed, among cancer patients, who arguably
have the most therapeutic incentive to volunteer for clinical trials, the
participation rate is less than 4%. 104 Therefore, big pharmaceutical's
collective glut of experimental drugs and challenges in securing
human research subjects has literally created an intense competition
for bodies on a global scale. Further, because it is difficult to bring the
bodies "over here," more and more clinical trials are moving "over
there," to developing countries. 10 5
The fact that the number of clinical investigators in the United
States has been shrinking at a rate matched by an almost commensu-
rate growth in investigators overseas demonstrates the globalization
phenomenon. 10 6 Huge pharmaceutical companies, such as Merck,
GlaxoSmithKline, and Wyeth, have estimated that they have recently
expanded their human trials outside of the United States and Western
Europe by 67%. 107 Even small start-up companies without a multina-
tional footprint can get into the globalization game by outsourcing
their clinical trials to CROs that conduct the clinical trials on their
behalf.108
B. Severing the Umbilical Cord with Academic Institutions
As discussed above, by the late 1960s, researchers were testing the
vast majority of U.S. experimental drugs on inmates in prison research
facilities across the country.' 0 9 This distribution shifted after investi-
101. Id. at 329-30.
102. For example, see the discussion on the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, supra notes 43-46 and
accompanying text.
103. SHAH, supra note 92, at 4.
104. Id.
105. See generally SHAH, supra note 92. However, for some European pharmaceutical compa-
nies, it is not cost-prohibitive to bring test subjects to their home facilities. For instance, Swiss
pharmaceutical companies have relied on recruiting subjects from the Baltic States and other
European countries and flying them to test facilities located in Switzerland. See Sharon
LaFraniere et al., The Dilemma: Submit or Suffer, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2000, at Al (article
three of the Body Hunters series). Obviously, if you added the cost of immigration, transporta-
tion, and other barriers, this practice would not be as appealing for test subjects recruited in
Africa or Asia.
106. SHAH, supra note 92, at xi.
107. Id.
108. See Ass'n of Clinical Research Orgs., CRO Industry Getting a Thumbs Up from Wall
Street, available at http://www.acrohealth.org/Keylssues.php?id=8&page=2 (last visited Feb. 12,
2008).
109. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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gations revealed serious ethical violations in the prison research facili-
ties and caused drug companies to increase their ties to academia. 110
From an ethics standpoint, the benefit of the enhanced pharma-uni-
versity relationship arguably is that it at least ensures that the aca-
demic institution's IRB provides a higher degree of accountability."
However, as the size of the drug market dramatically expanded in the
1980s and 1990s, pharmaceutical companies became impatient with
academic centers, and by the late 1990s the monetary flow from drug
companies to academic centers had greatly receded.' 1 2 As noted in
the New England Journal of Medicine in 2000, "[p]harmaceutical firms
are frustrated with academic medical centers ... [because] [s]low re-
view of industry proposals . . . delays the starting date of trials."'"13
Tapping on the shoulder of academic centers, and deftly not missing
a step with the drug industry, has been the modus operandi of a rela-
tively new enterprise, the CRO. CROs offer to take a company's pro-
posal for a drug trial and then rapidly deliver patients, investigators,
and ultimately crucial data for an NDA. 114 In fact, CROs have proven
to be such good dance partners that this industry, which does not pro-
duce any tangible product, has become a multi-billion-dollar business
with expected double-digit growth until at least the next decade.' 15
Further, through years of industry consolidation, large multinational
pharmaceutical corporations certainly have the resources to conduct
their trials in-house, without the aid of academic institutions.
In addition to the sheer number of drug trials, the pharmaceutical
industry's desire for fast market approval is also driving the intense
competition for testing bodies. For every day that a major blockbus-
ter drug is delayed from entering the market, researchers estimate
that there is a corresponding $1 million loss in revenue. 116 The Hatch-
110. See Hoffman, supra note 20, at 488-91 (discussing the outrage over prisoner experiments
and the resulting consequences).
111. This is not to ignore literature citing the limitations of the current IRB regime to ade-
quately protect research subjects. But this flawed regime certainly provides greater protection
than what was afforded U.S. inmates prior to the Belmont Report, and to participants in many
developing nations today. See generally Carl H. Coleman, Duties to Subjects in Clinical Re-
search, 58 VAND. L. REV. 387 (2005); Jesse A. Goldner, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest in
Biomedical Research: IRB Oversight as the Next Best Solution to the Abolitionist Approach, 28
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 379 (2000).
112. SHAH, supra note 92, at 6.
113. Id. (citing Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance-Clinical Investigators and the Phar-
maceutical Industry, 342 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1539 (2000)).
114. Id. at 6-7.
115. See Dr. Jayashree, Clinical Research Outsourcing: Overview, Current Scenario & Future
Outlook, http://www.ibpassociation.org/IBPA-articles/Outsoursing.htm (last visited Feb. 12,
2008).
116. SHAH, supra note 92, at 5.
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Waxman Act mitigates economic losses from delayed market ap-
proval, but the extension is limited to five years." 17 In addition, there
are other market factors that drive the rush for drug approval, such as
the desire to get a "first-mover advantage" in a particular drug seg-
ment or secure additional investment resources." 18
The drastic difference in regulatory standards and testing costs be-
tween developed and developing countries provides pharmaceutical
companies with immense incentives to relocate clinical trials over-
seas.'t 9 In essence, drug companies engage in regulatory and eco-
nomic arbitrage. In coarse business terms, "the value proposition" of
developing countries to pharmaceutical companies is the ability to
conduct substantial amounts of research with little or no prior re-
straint from regulatory bodies and lower capital outlays. 120 The "riski-
est experiments are among the first to be sent abroad.' 121 The
unspoken understanding is that, if the host country enforces laws the
multinational company dislikes, the company could simply move its
resources to a less burdensome host country.
C. Exhuming Conrad? Pfizer's Excursion into the
Heart of an Epidemic
The tale of Pfizer's Trovan drug trial in Kano, Nigeria is troubling
for several reasons. First, there was the cynical exploitation of a tragic
situation-an epidemic in a failed military dictatorship. Then, there
117. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly re-
ferred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act, grants drug patent holders a period of additional marketing
exclusivity to compensate for development time. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of U.S.C.). The extension is added on to the term of exclusivity granted by the initial
patent. Id.
118. "First-mover advantage" has been defined as follows:
The early bird gets the worm. [Game theory] shows that being the first to enter a
market or to introduce an [innovation] can be a huge advantage, not just because the
first firm in can erect [barriers to entry], but also because potential rivals may be dis-
couraged from committing the resources necessary to compete successfully. However,
this advantage may sometimes be cancelled out by the benefits enjoyed by followers,
such as the chance to avoid-and learn from-the mistakes made by the first mover.
http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/alphabetic.cfmLETrER=F (last visited Feb. 12,
2008).
119. Almost all large pharmaceutical companies are publicly traded and must compete for
investment to continue manufacturing and developing new drugs. To the extent that a certain
company's operating expenses and profit margins do not match up favorably with its competi-
tors, it will be difficult for this company to maintain investor confidence and attract more invest-
ment dollars. Market competition thus pressures the entire industry to globalize their clinical
research. See Flaherty et al., supra note 68.
120. See id.
121. DuBois, supra note 34, at 195.
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was the casual indifference to basic ethical guidelines, including ob-
taining informed consent and prior IRB approval. But the most dis-
turbing aspect occurred after the trial commenced. It was the drug
company's attitude of impunity-the conceit that it would face no
consequences for the harms it inflicted upon impoverished and unwit-
ting human test subjects.
1. Medical Crisis in Nigeria
In 1996, a massive outbreak of bacterial meningitis swept through
Western Africa. 122 Kano, Nigeria, an impoverished city of two million
residents, was particularly hard hit.' 23 Bacterial meningitis is a serious
infection of the tissue lining the spinal cord and brain. 124 In addition
to severe motor and mental damage, untreated meningitis can cause
death.125
At the time of the outbreak, Nigeria was run by a military dictator-
ship that had one of world's worst human rights and corruption
records. 126 Therefore, despite massive oil wealth, Nigeria's medical
and social infrastructure was woefully poor. 127 Revenues from the oil
fields primarily enriched foreign oil companies and a small coterie of
connected elites.128 Nigerian healthcare also suffered from severe
"brain drain," as a large percentage of Nigerian-trained doctors emi-
grated to North America and Europe. 129 A few years prior to the
outbreak, the United Nations (UN) estimated that 21,000 Nigerian
doctors were practicing in the United States, while there was a severe
shortage of doctors in Nigeria. 130 All of these factors added up to a
humanitarian crisis as the Nigerian government was ill-prepared to
serve the needs of its citizens. In this maelstrom, foreigners set up two
medical camps on the grounds of the same hospital. 131 What hap-
pened at the camps was as different as light and darkness.
122. See Kristen Farrell, Comment, Human Experimentation in Developing Countries: Im-
proving International Practices by Identifying Vulnerable Populations and Allocating Fair Bene-
fits, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 136, 137 (2006).
123. See Stephens, supra note 1.
124. See World Health Org., supra note 2.
125. Id.
126. See Stephens, supra note 1.
127. See CIA, THE WORLD FACrOOK 2007, at 422-24 (2007).
128. See id.
129. Virginia Gidley-Kitchin, UN Tackles African Brain Drain, BBC NEws, Feb. 22, 2000,
available at http:/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/652801.stm.
130. Id.
131. Stephens. supra note 1.
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2. Kano: A Tale of Two Camps
The Infectious Disease Hospital in Kano is a run-down compound
of cinderblock buildings, some lacking electricity, running water, and
the ability to properly dispose of human waste. 132 Medecins Sans
Frontieres (MSF) arrived first and began to treat the victims of the
outbreak with the standard line therapy for bacterial meningitis, an
intensive course of IV antibiotics. 33 MSF used an inexpensive ge-
neric antibiotic, chloramphenicol, which it had in ample supply. 134
Whereas MSF treated the outbreak as a humanitarian crisis de-
manding prompt medical treatment, Pfizer saw the outbreak as an op-
portunity. In Pfizer's pipeline was Trovan, a broad-spectrum
antibiotic projected by financial analysts to be a $1 billion blockbuster
drug if it received market approval. 35 Pfizer's problem was that it did
not have enough clinical data to receive regulatory approval. 136 The
solution to Pfizer's problem was the Infectious Disease Hospital in
Kano, which, by February 1996, was receiving 120 new patients every
day, many of them children. 37
After learning of the outbreak on the internet, Dr. Scott Hopkins,
who then led Pfizer's Trovan development team, drew up a plan to
test an oral form, rather than an IV version, of Trovan on the children
in the Kano clinic.' 38 If the oral form of Trovan could be shown to
work on children as well as IV antibiotics, it would be a tremendous
"breakthrough in battling epidemics" worldwide. 139 "Children could
simply swallow a pill" rather than receive injections that increase the
risk of blood-borne diseases, such as HIV and hepatitis.' 40 Further, a
pill would remove the need for skilled healthcare workers to assist in
administration.
132. Id.
133. Id. MSF is also known as Doctors Without Borders. MSF-USA: Doctors Without Bor-
ders, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
134. See Stephens, supra note 1. Furthermore, chloramphenicol had been recommended by
the WHO as the first-line treatment for bacterial meningitis in low-income countries. See World
Health Org., supra note 2.
135. Stephens, supra note 1.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. Many developing nations cannot afford to dispose of syringes or IV needles after
each use, so they are disinfected and reused. Improper disinfection can lead to the spread of
blood-borne diseases. See Reynolds Holding & William Carlsen, Deadly Needles: Fast Track to
Global Disaster, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 27, 1998, at Al. available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/
article.cgi?f=/C/a/1998/10/27/MN52NEE.DTL.
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To take advantage of this situation, spokesperson Betsy Raymond
stated that Pfizer "had to move quickly."' 14 1 The purported reason
was that "[Pfizer] would not be able to find those numbers of children
with spinal meningitis in the U.S."' 142 However, even if Pfizer could
find scores of children in the United States with spinal meningitis, it
would be inconceivable that any American parent would approve or
consent to their child's enrollment in an experimental antibiotics trial
given the availability of proven therapies and the risks of non-effica-
cious treatment.
Pfizer reported that the experimental -trial won rapid approval in
Nigeria after an "independent review" by Nigerian authorities and
"approval [by] a Kano hospital ethics committee."'143 Regarding the
Nigerian military government, Dr. Hopkins explained that it was "a
desperate time for them-they were happy to have anyone come in
and do just about any kind of work."' 144 Thus, in the sixth week of the
meningitis outbreak, a team of Pfizer researchers flew into Nigeria
and set up camp in the Kano hospital.' 45
Tensions between MSF and Pfizer arose immediately, as Pfizer's
presence disrupted MSF's triagek system. MSF had arranged the pa-
tients so that the sickest slept on the few available beds and benches
and the less severely sick slept on mats in outdoor tents.146 For its
experimental trial, Pfizer took over two of the best maintained wards,
including most of the precious bed space. 147 Pfizer also siphoned most
of the experienced Nigerian physicians and nurses who were treating
patients with MSF by paying them double the hospital's wages. 148 The
Pfizer team spent less than two months in Nigeria and offered no
long-term follow-up care to the test subjects. 149 After the trial con-
cluded, the data were sent to the United States and promptly submit-
ted to the FDA. 50
This gambit initially appeared to work for Pfizer. Pfizer submitted
the Kano data to regulators, and Trovan subsequently received FDA
approval.15 1 Trovan quickly became one of Pfizer's top sellers, earn-
141. Stephens, supra note 1.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Stephens, supra note 1.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. Id.
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ing over $160 million in its first year, well on its way to its predicted $1
billion market share.152 But, then, things started to fall apart.
3. The Unraveling of Trovan
In 1997, FDA inspectors discovered inconsistencies in the data sub-
mitted by Pfizer from the Kano trial. 153 In response to one particular
FDA request, Pfizer submitted a document, dated March 1996, that
purported to be from the ethics committee of a Kano teaching hospi-
tal.154 This document stated that the hospital ethics committee re-
viewed and approved Pfizer's Trovan study protocol before it was
implemented in Kano. 155 Upon further inquiry, however, the Niger-
ian government discovered that the document was a forgery allegedly
produced by a Nigerian doctor who was paid $20,000 by Pfizer.156 It
was a poorly conceived forgery, as such things go; the referenced eth-
ics committee did not exist in March 1996, when the trial was suppos-
edly approved, only coming into existence seven months later in
October 1996.157 In other words, the trial never had IRB approval,
and Pfizer committed fraud not only upon the people of Kano, but
also upon the FDA. These details all seemed moot, at least from the
FDA's mandate, after postmarketing reports of liver failure from
Trovan's administration led to its severely restricted use in adults in
the United States and an outright ban in Europe. 58 Thus, the story of
the Trovan trial in Kano was destined to die as an ephemeral conspir-
acy, chattered about on some internet sites, but mostly ignored or dis-
missed as unverifiable antiglobalization hyperbole. But, in 2000, an
investigation by the Washington Post shocked this story back to life. 159
First and foremost was the issue of informed consent, or rather the
lack thereof. Many of the patients and their parents claimed that they
did not know that they were participating in an experimental drug
trial. 160 They simply arrived at the Kano hospital with the under-
standing that international medical relief workers were there to treat
them.16' This assertion was confirmed by several Nigerian healthcare
152. Id.
153. Stephens, supra note 1.
154. Barnaby Phillips, Nigeria's Drug Trial Fears, BBC NEWS, Mar. 14, 2001, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/1220032.stm.
155. Id.
156. Joe Stephens, Pfizer Faces New Charges Over Nigerian Drug Test, WASH. PosT, June 2,
2007, at D1.
157. Phillips, supra note 154.
158. Stephens, supra note 1.
159. See supra note 1.
160. See Stephens, supra note 1.
161. See id
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workers who actually worked for Pfizer during the trial. 162 In the
words of one healthcare worker, "The patients did not know if it was
research or not ... [t]hey just knew they were sick. ' 163 Pfizer claimed
that local nurses were trained to explain the drug trials to patients and
families, and they asserted that informed consent was received. 164
However, Pfizer was not able to produce any informed consent
forms. 1
6 5
Further, there was evidence that Pfizer failed to switch children who
were not showing any signs of improvement with Trovan onto stan-
dard therapy.1 66 This breach in standard protocol allegedly led to se-
vere brain damage or death in several children. 167 Additionally, there
was testimony that, in the control group, Pfizer only administered
one-third of the recommended dose of the antibiotic ceftriaxone-es-
sentially a nontherapeutic dose-in order to make any beneficial ef-
fects in the Trovan treatment group seem greater by comparison. 68
Compounding all of this were the families' assertions that Pfizer never
told them that they were free to refuse participation in the experimen-
tal trial and instead receive free treatment in the MSF camp.169
So why does this narrative about Kano and Pfizer matter? Isn't the
obvious resolution to this tale that the Nigerian victims of this unethi-
cal trial will sue Pfizer for countless dollars? Won't this legal recourse
act as a deterrent for such abuses regardless of whether a potential
blockbuster drug is involved? As will be discussed in the next Part, it
is not clear that the victims of Kano have any power to hold Pfizer
accountable in a court of law, and other multinational drug companies
besides Pfizer are certainly aware of this calculus.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Stephens, supra note 1.
167. Id. Given the children's ill health, one cannot say for certain whether they would have
survived if promptly switched to a standard therapy-but it is still a clear ethical violation, and
contravention of industry practice, to continue experimental treatment in the face of nonrespon-
siveness when a proven therapy is available. See id.
168. See Marcia Angell, The Body Hunters, 52 N.Y. REV. BooKs 23 (Oct. 6, 2005) (reviewing
the movie The Constant Gardener and drawing parallels to Pfizer's Trovan trial in Kano).
169. See Samantha Evans, Note, The Globalization of Drug Testing: Enforcing Informed Con-
sent Through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 19 TEMP. INr'L & CoMp. L.J. 477, 480 (2005).
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IV. USING SoFr LAW TO PLAY HARDBALL
WITH THE DRUG INDUSTRY
A. The Challenge of Regulating Multinational Corporations
Multinational companies are notoriously difficult to regulate. In a
sense they are denationalized; by using multiple facilities around the
globe, corporations can strategically evade state power and certain na-
tional regulatory schemes. 170 Further, for pharmaceutical companies
in particular, developing nations' relative lack of ethical standards en-
forcement means that these corporations "can operate [overseas] in a
largely unregulated manner.' 171
From an international law perspective, the challenges are both
"horizontal" and "vertical" in nature, and the legal responses can be
"hard" or "soft."'1 72 For clinical drug trials, horizontal challenges con-
stitute problems that arise between nations trying to regulate multina-
tional drug companies that operate across international borders. 73
Vertical challenges are problems with unethical trials that nations-
more likely developing nations with limited resources-face inside
their borders.174 "Hard law" is represented by rule-based systems,
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), with binding authority
on member states.175 "Soft law" represents guidelines, practices, and
policies generated by NGOs for voluntary self-regulation by industry
or future adoption by states.176 These guidelines do not have binding
legal authority, which is why they are considered soft rather than
hard. 177
Addressing the ethical problems associated with globalized trials,
some scholars have advocated a "hard horizontal" approach, envi-
sioning an international organization with binding authority to en-
force ethical standards in clinical trials on a global basis. 78 Other
170. See DuBois, supra note 34, at 195-96.
171. Id. at 196; accord Benjamin Mason Meier, International Protection of Persons Undergo-
ing Medical Experimentation: Protecting the Right of Informed Consent, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 513, 532 (2002) ("[The] legislative vacuum [of medical experimentation regulations in devel-
oping countries] is intentional. While governments of these nations are desperate to bring medi-
cal research to their dying populations, their nations cannot afford such research without
subsidies from multinational pharmaceutical corporations.").
172. See David P. Fidler, Emerging Trends in International Law Concerning Global Infectious
Disease Control, 9 EMERGING INFEcTious DISEASES 285, 285, 288 (2003).
173. Id. at 285.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 288.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Ruqaiijah Yearby, Good Enough To Use for Research, But Not Good Enough
To Benefit from the Results of that Research: Are the Clinical HIV Vaccine Trials in Africa Un-
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commentators have argued for a "hard vertical" approach with hori-
zontal effects-that is, an expansive reading of the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) to allow U.S. courts to enforce foreign violations of ethical
standards. 179 These proposals have merit in that they advocate
greater accountability and justice in globalized drug trials, but this Ar-
ticle argues that there are practical limitations to these proposals:
they do not offer the ethical protection for vulnerable research popu-
lations that they promise. Instead, this Article proposes that horizon-
tal soft-law techniques, such as increased monitoring and reporting on
globalized drug trials, can be used to vertically enforce existing hard-
law drug approval regulations in lucrative markets, such as the United
States and the EU, in order to deter unethical research globally.
B. Is the Alien Tort Statute a Viable Means of Enforcing
International Violations of Ethical Standards?
Countries hosting drug trials naturally have jurisdiction, or vertical
control, over the companies involved in such testing.180 However, as
some commentators have pointed out, judicial protection for research
subjects in developing countries is virtually absent. 181 In response,
these commentators have argued for an expansive reading of the ATS
to expand the United States's ability to hear foreign tort claims arising
from clinical drug trials:
One method of enforcing accountability in the globalization of
drug testing is through litigation subjecting corporate abusers to
enormous damages. Because legislative and judicial protection in
underdeveloped and often corrupt host countries is nonexistent,
U.S. courts should provide a forum to punish extraterritorial abuses
of informed consent during human subject experimental research
just?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1127, 1150 (2004) ("Another possible solution to prevent the contin-
ued exploitation of Africans and the perversion of the Justice requirement is the creation of an
international compulsory standard of ethical protections of human subjects participating in
clinical trials. The standards would be drafted, implemented, and enforced by one international
body.").
179. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 169, at 478-79.
180. See Fidler, supra note 172, at 285.
181. For example, Kelleher explained as follows:
Unfortunately, many host countries do not regulate to protect human subjects of
clinical trials. This lack of legislation is often intentional; clinical trials provide treat-
ment that the governments of these countries would never be able to afford. For exam-
ple, "African nations vie to minimize regulation on the conduct of medical research.
They fear that legislation, and resulting lawsuits, could have a chilling effect on benefi-
cial research efforts." Malawi, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia, for ex-
ample, do not have legally binding informed consent procedures ....
Kelleher, supra note 36, at 85.
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sponsored by all companies that engage in business in the United
States.' 82
Yet, as discussed below, opening U.S. courts to hear alien tort claims
of abuse by multinational drug companies does not appear to be a
viable solution.1 83
But for the 2000 Washington Post investigation, Pfizer could have
easily presumed that the ghost of Kano would not haunt them.1 84 As
a direct result of that investigation, in 2001, the American plaintiffs'
law firm of Milberg Weiss filed suit in U.S. federal court against Pfizer
on behalf of Nigerian children and families that participated in the
Trovan trial. 185 In Abdullahi v. Pfizer, the plaintiffs brought an action
under the ATS to recover damages for Pfizer's alleged breach of the
Code, the Declaration, the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (ICCPR), and the "law of nations."' 86
The ATS was part of the Judiciary Act of 1789187 and states the
following: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States."' 18 8 The ATS was
largely forgotten and rarely used until invoked by plaintiffs in 1980 in
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.89 The Filartiga suit was filed by relatives of a
Paraguayan who was kidnapped and tortured to death by the defen-
dant, a Paraguayan police official. 190 This opened the door to more
182. Evans, supra note 169, at 478-79; accord Talati, supra note 74, at 234 ("[Tjhe ATS ...
provides the most promising remedy for an individual whose right to informed consent has been
violated in a clinical trial conducted in a developing country. While there are significant barriers
to succeeding on any ATS claim, these barriers ... should not preclude a plaintiff from bringing
an action.").
183. In addition to failing under the Sosa test, see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692
(2004), this proposal runs into other difficulties. Extraterritorial extension of U.S. regulations
could run afoul of the doctrine of international comity: "International comity is a doctrine that
counsels voluntary forebearance when a sovereign [that] has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction
concludes that a second sovereign also has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction under principles of
international law." DuBois, supra note 34, at 196 (quoting United States v. Nippon Paper Indus.
Co., 109 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997)). Also, one could anticipate that the extraterritorial application
of U.S. or European law onto other nations would be perceived as tantamount to legal imperial-
ism, with the developed world imposing its rules on unwilling countries. Id. at 205.
184. See Stephens, supra note 1.
185. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. (Abdullahi 1), No. 01-Civ.-8118, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436, at
*1-8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2002).
186. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); Abdullahi I, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436, at
*1.
187. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
188. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
189. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
190. Id. at 878-79.
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foreigners filing ATS suits in the United States. 191 However, in 2004,
the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
and left the door open only a crack. 192
In Sosa, the Court determined that the ATS "was intended only to
prohibit conduct for a moderate number of new international law vio-
lations that were sufficiently 'specific, universal, and obligatory."'
1 93
Further, the Court severely limited the application of the ATS by rea-
soning that it only provided a means of redress if the abuse com-
plained of had been recognized as a violation of international law
when the statute was enacted, stating that "[w]e are persuaded that
federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal com-
mon law for violations of any international law norm with less definite
content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical par-
adigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted."1 94 The Court also held
that, when applying the ATS test, a lower court must "consider the
practical consequences of making that cause of action available as an
avenue of relief in the federal courts."' 195
In Abdullahi v. Pfizer, the court recognized that "non-consensual
medical experimentation violates the law of nations and, therefore,
the laws of the United States."'1 96 However, citing Sosa, the court ex-
plained that this judicial finding provided plaintiffs with no relief,197 as
"[t]he law of nations generally does not create private causes of action
to remedy its violations, but leaves to each nation the task of defining
the remedies that are available for international law violations."1 98
Similarly, the court found that, while the ICCPR "does bind the
United States as a matter of international law, the United States rati-
fied the Covenant on the express understanding that it was not self-
executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the
federal courts." 199 In other words, even if the plaintiffs proved that
Pfizer violated the law of nations or the ICCPR, they would not have
standing to enforce such violations under Sosa.
191. Cyril Kormos et al., U.S. Participation in International Environmental Law and Policy, 13
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 661, 673 (2001) ("In 1980, the Second Circuit's landmark decision
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala applied the ATS in the context of human rights violations, and in so doing
opened the door to more ATS cases.").
192. 542 U.S. 692.
193. Evans, supra note 169, at 483 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732).
194. Id. at 484 (emphasis in original) (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732).
195. Id. at 485.
196. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. (Abdullahi III), No. 01-Civ.-8118, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16126,
at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005).
197. Id. at *25-26 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712-14).
198. Id. at *26 (quoting Kadic v. Daradzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cit. 1995)).
199. Id. at *36.
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The Abdullahi court also addressed the plaintiffs' claims that viola-
tions of international law as set forth in the Code and the Declaration
supported jurisdiction under the ATS. 200 First addressing the Code,
the court held that, because "the United States has not ratified or
adopted the Nuremberg Code ... this Court declines to find the Nu-
remberg Code a binding source of international law giving rise to a
private cause of action under the ATS. ''20t Turning to the Declara-
tion, the court declared that "[t]he Helsinki Accord does not create a
private right of action in U.S. federal courts and does not have the
force of law .... The Declaration of Helsinki .. .is a mere general
statement of policy that is unlikely to give rise to obligations in any
strict sense. '20 2 The court reasoned as follows:
[A] court is not granted a roving commission to pick and choose
among declarations of public and private international organiza-
tions that have articulated a view on the matter at hand. Such dec-
larations are almost invariably political statements-expressing the
sensibilities and the asserted aspirations and demands of some
countries or organizations-rather than statements of universally-
recognized legal obligations. 203
Thus, the court found that the Declaration was not binding law. 20 4
Four years of dismissals and appeals in the United States and Nige-
ria in the Trovan litigation20 5 demonstrate the irrelevancy of interna-
tional law in protecting human research subjects. The plaintiffs'
claims were ultimately dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and forum non conveniens. 20 6 Regarding the forum non conveniens
claim, plaintiffs argued in vain that Nigeria was not a suitable forum,
as one Nigerian judge-later dismissed for accepting bribes-delayed
the start of the suit against Pfizer indeterminately, and the subsequent
replacement judge stated that he would not hear the case for "per-
sonal reasons. ' 20 7 If plaintiffs failed under these alleged facts in a fo-
rum non conveniens analysis, it is hard to imagine a scenario where
they would succeed. Perhaps the situation would have to be a war-
torn, failed state where there was no effective government. But such a
scenario, where a foreign drug company enters such a volatile envi-
ronment, is unlikely. Therefore, it appears that multinational drug
200. Id. at *31-35.
201. Id. at *31-32.
202. Abdullahi I11, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16126, at *33-34 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
203. Id. at *34.
204. Id.
205. See id. at *2, *5-14.
206. Id. at *2.
207. Id. at *6-15, *45-53.
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corporations are unfettered by international law or the domestic legal
apparatuses in developing nations, and a new strategy is needed to
deter unethical abuses in human clinical trials. 208
C. Is International Enforcement of Ethical Standards Feasible?
Several commentators have proposed that international ethical
standards be established as binding hard law and then be enforced
horizontally through some kind of international institution, such as
the UN. 20 9 This Article is sympathetic with the goals of such propos-
als; however, it does not appear that they would be viable at any time
in the near future. The major barriers are the matters of sovereignty
and enforcement. 210
208. In 1999. the military dictatorship that was in power during the Trovan trial was replaced
by a democratically elected civilian government. See THE WORLD FACrBoOK, supra note 127. at
422-24. In 2000, the Washington Post exposd about the drug trial caused an uproar and
prompted not only lawsuits, but a Nigerian government investigation into what happened at
Kano. Joe Stephens, Panel Faults Pfizer in '96 Clinical Trials in Nigeria, WASH. Posr, May 7,
2006, at Al. This government report, authored in 2001, concluded that Pfizer conducted an
illegal drug trial that exploited those who did not clearly know that they were participating in a
drug experiment, and that the government never gave authorization for this trial. Id. However,
for unidentified reasons, the government suppressed this report for over five years and made
only three copies. Id. One of the authors of the report later stated that he received death
threats in connection with producing this document. Id. It was only through extraordinary cir-
cumstances-an anonymous leak to the international press-that this report became public five
years later in 2006. Id. As a result of the leaked report, in June 2007, Nigeria filed criminal
charges against Pfizer and is seeking almost $7 billion in a civil suit. Stephens, supra note 156.
This might lead one to argue that Nigeria was the proper venue for this case all along and that a
legal deterrent to the actions Pfizer allegedly committed exists. However, it is evident that but
for the extraordinary leak of the 2001 report and the corresponding threat to the government's
legitimacy, Nigeria would not have pursued any claim against Pfizer. In other words, because it
was not likely or predictable that Pfizer would be held accountable for its actions in the Trovan
trial, it does not appear that a credible deterrent to future ethical abuses in similar countries
exists.
209. See, e.g., Yearby, supra note 178, at 1150.
210. One commentator further explained the barrier of enforcement:
The concept of enforcement, of course, is subject to interpretation. It could be ar-
gued, for example, that in the absence of the power to enforce, no legal duty can exist.
On the other hand, it could also be argued that the concepts of 'duty' and 'enforce-
ment' are in fact distinct and that duties-both in moral and legal terms-can be as-
sumed by nations even when enforcement is impractical or abstract. In either event,
this Article takes the position that treaty duties-including the duty to provide the
highest attainable standard of health-are enforceable by means of a number of indi-
vidual and interstate complaint systems at the domestic, regional, and international
levels.
Wesley A. Cann. Jr., On the Relationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and the Need of
Less-Developed Countries for Access to Pharmaceuticals: Creating a Legal Duty to Supply Under
a Theory of Progressive Global Constitutionalism, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 755, 876-77
(2004).
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Focusing particularly on HIV drug trials in Africa, Professor Yearby
counseled that the best way to protect the interests of these popula-
tions is by enforcing ethical standards through an international organi-
zation.211 Yearby persuasively reasoned that other proposed schemes
to protect the interests of test populations, such as using prior agree-
ments between African countries and foreign researchers, are prob-
lematic, because "there is no enforcement mechanism." 212 Instead,
Yearby made the following recommendation:
[A] possible solution ... is the creation of an international com-
pulsory standard of ethical protections of human subjects participat-
ing in clinical trials. The standard would be drafted, implemented,
and enforced by one international body. The United Nations Pro-
gramme on HIV and AIDS has become the premier international
organization in terms of HIV and AIDS research and would be the
best place for this newly formed international regulatory body. For
the organization to be effective, the standards must have penalties if
they are violated, and the organization must have some ability to
enforce their decisions. The organization's ability to enforce this
standard will be subject to the structure of its governing document
and the membership of the organization....
With the creation of this compulsory international statement of
ethics and enforcement, researchers and private funders will be held
accountable for their ethical violations and deterred from commit-
ting the violation again, thus protecting vulnerable populations from
exploitation. 213
A similar proposal hypothesizes that the UN could create a perma-
nent Nuremberg-like tribunal to enforce international human
rights.214
Focusing on transnational corporations generally, not pharmaceuti-
cal companies in particular, another article proposes that the UN es-
tablish an international organization to deal with the special human
rights problems posed by these companies. 215 The benefits of a single
international institution include economies of scale and predictabil-
ity.216 A lone institution could ensure that companies comply with
human rights standards, whereas different nations would have redun-
211. See Yearby, supra note 178, at 1132.
212. Id. at 1149.
213. Id. at 1150-51.
214. See Robert F. Drinan, The Nuremberg Principles in International Law, in THE NAZI Doc-
TORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHrs IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 174, 176-78
(George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992). The problem now is "how to get these
principles, which are universally accepted, implemented and enforced throughout the world."
Id. at 176.
215. See Erin Elizabeth Macek, Note, Scratching the Corporate Back: Why Corporations
Have No Incentive to Define Human Rights, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 101, 122-24 (2002).
216. Id. at 120.
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dant regulatory bodies attempting the same function. 217 Another pro-
posal suggests that "the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) is well positioned to create a set of interna-
tional rules governing research on humans. 2 1 8 However, this propo-
sal recognizes that UNESCO would not be able to enforce any rules
or guidelines it might formulate.219 Thus, this proposal relies on the
enforcement mechanisms of nations in the developing world.
While all of the proposals above recognize the need for an interna-
tional standard of ethical guidelines to address transnational actors,
their shortcoming is their lack of a viable enforcement mechanism.
The seemingly intractable problem is one of sovereignty: How can an
international body enforce legal sanctions against a party if the of-
fending party's home country will not enforce the decision? We need
only look at the difficulty facing the International Criminal Court
(ICC) to envision why these proposals might not be viable.
For many years, the UN General Assembly has debated and passed
resolutions regarding the establishment of a permanent international
criminal tribunal. 220 Pursuant to this effort, the ICC was established
under the Statute of Rome.221 This Court was heralded as a "global
commitment to hold . . . perpetrators of gross [human rights] viola-
tions accountable for their crimes," and indeed it has overwhelming
support from most of "the world's nation states. '222 However, many
have doubted whether the ICC will ever be viable, as the United
States has vehemently objected to ICC accountability not only for
U.S. government officials and military personnel, but also for corpo-
rate officers engaged in business activities overseas.223 Commenting
on the American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002 (ASPA), 224
then Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security,
John Bolton,225 described the Bush Administration's expansive inter-
pretation of the ASPA:
217. See id.
218. DuBois, supra note 34, at 205.
219. Id.
220. Mark D. Kielsgard, War on the International Criminal Court, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 1, 1-2
(2005).
221. Id. at 2.
222. Id. (alteration in original).
223. Id. at 16-26, 47-48.
224. American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-7433 (Supp.
2002).
225. More importantly, he was appointed U.S. Ambassador to the UN in 2005. Sidestepping
Senate, Bush Sends Bolton to U.N., CNN.com, Aug. 2, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLIT-
ICS/08/01/bolton.appointment/index.html.
[Vol. 57:877
THE HUMAN FACTOR
This broad scope of coverage is essential to ensuring that the ICC
will not become an impediment to U.S. activities around the world.
We must guarantee the necessary protection to our media, delega-
tions of public and private individuals traveling to international
meetings, private individuals accompanying official personnel, con-
tractors working along side official personnel ... people engaged in
commerce and business abroad ... to name just a few categories of
persons. 226
As it stands, the ICC has a narrow scope of jurisdiction and "will only
hear four criminal charges: genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and crimes of aggression. ' 227 Further, the criminal court as-
sumes jurisdiction only under extraordinary circumstances and is un-
willing to encroach upon a nation's sovereignty. 228 The potency and
relevancy of the ICC is further diminished by the fact that China and
India refuse to recognize it.229
D. Using Soft Law to Exploit Hard Regulations
that Have International Effects
The core of this Article's proposed strategy is as follows: if the
fruits of unethical research were denied access to the U.S. and EU
markets, it would have the same effect as a global prohibition. In
other words, this proposal argues that there is a way to achieve the
same effect desired by the proposals discussed above-global deter-
rence of unethical research practices-without resorting to impractical
legal schemes predicated on international enforcement bodies or
quasi-universal jurisdiction in U.S. courts. Rather than exclusively re-
lying on hard-law strategies, soft-law measures can be used in conjunc-
tion with existing drug regulatory powers to manipulate access to the
most economically lucrative markets: the United States, the EU, and
Japan.
If the hard legal authority to effectuate this proposal already exists,
why do we continue to see ethical abuses in globalized clinical trials?
The problem is structural in the sense that human research subjects,
especially in developing nations, are not invested with any soft or hard
power. to hold drug companies accountable for their actions. As dis-
cussed above, investing these groups with hard power-for example,
through ready access to U.S. courts-is problematic and not likely in
226. Kielsgard, supra note 220, at 26.
227. Id. at 7.
228. See id. at 7-8.
229. See Indian Economy to Surpass Japan, THE FIN. EXPRESS, May 28, 2007, http://www.
financialexpress.com/old/latest-full-story.php?contentid=165462; Q&A: International Crimi-
nal Court, BBC NEws, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilafrica/3834237.stm (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
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the foreseeable future.230 However, there should be a way to invest
these persons with more soft power than currently achieved by inter-
national health organizations and other NGOs typically headquar-
tered in London, Geneva, or Washington, D.C. With the increasing
accessibility of cheap internet communication, these organizations can
empower human research subjects and concerned citizens in develop-
ing nations with much of the surveillance and monitoring activities of
clinical drug trials. For instance, the WHO could maintain a website
where alleged ethical violations can be reported with buttons translat-
ing the pages into all of the official UN languages. This reporting
could then cause WHO officials to get a reporter's sworn statement,
which would lead to an investigation into the alleged ethical abuses.
This surveillance strategy seeks to provide a highly sensitive method
of detecting ethical abuses by minimizing both the barriers to report-
ing and the triggering mechanism for an investigation. Even in sub-
Saharan Africa and impoverished parts of Asia, internet access is
readily available through internet cafes, kiosks, and cell phones. 231
Further, anonymizing internet technology can be used to protect re-
porters of violations in authoritarian or repressive regimes.
The strategy described above would require additional resources to
be spent in the area of clinical drug monitoring, so it is unclear how
this scheme would be paid for and if it is really worth the expense.
Devolving some of the monitoring functions to those being tested and
concerned NGOs would mitigate some of the expenses. Further,
under the framework of the ICH, which includes groups such as Phar-
maceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the
industry can be pressed to partially fund such an initiative, because, to
the extent the drug industry is perceived as taking the lead in self-
regulation to prevent ethical abuses in clinical trials, it can use this
effort to portray itself in a positive light.2 32 Such an initiative can im-
prove the image of the drug industry worldwide and can mitigate the
resistance that this industry faces from many social activists who be-
lieve it exploits the powerlessness of developing nation populations
for the benefit of rich countries. 233 Further, drug regulatory agencies
230. For a discussion of Abdullahi, see supra notes 185-204 and accompanying text.
231. See Of Internet Cafds and Power Cuts, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 9. 2008, at 75.
232. PhRMA represents the pharmaceutical and biomedical industries in the United States.
See About PhRMA, http://www.phrma.org/about-phrma/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). It is led by
Billy Tauzin, a former U.S. Congressman from Louisiana, and is widely recognized as one of the
most powerful industry lobbying groups in the United States. See Jim Drinkard, Drugmakers
Go Furthest to Sway Congress, USA TODAY, Apr. 26, 2005, at lB.
233. See generally PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS. AND
THE NEW WAR ON THE POOR (2005); SHAH. supra note 92. This characterization has most fa-
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involved with the ICH could increase NDA application fees to fund
such an initiative. Because the FDA has a spotty record but an actual
statutory mandate for ensuring that certain ethical standards are met
in foreign drug trials, it and other drug regulatory agencies would ben-
efit from robust monitoring and surveillance of foreign human clinical
trials while they are still in progress.
The simple fact that clinical investigators know that they are being
watched would tend to make them more diligent in applying ethical
standards.234 Furthermore, if monitoring and subsequent investiga-
tions by the WHO or some other trusted organization turn up evi-
dence of ethical abuses, then activists can make this information
public and use it to pressure drug regulatory agencies to block market
approval of experimental drugs that were tested unethically. Making
such ethical allegations public after confirming their veracity would
shift the burden in the court of world opinion onto the alleged viola-
tors to prove that their trials were conducted in an ethical manner.
This de facto burden shifting is fair, as the drug companies conducting
the trials technically should already have proof of informed consent
and patient protection procedures ready for viewing if they are con-
ducting a trial consistent with international ethical norms.
E. Applying the Proposal to the Trovan Case
Assuming that Trovan had turned out to be a $1 billion drug that
was safe and efficacious, how would this proposal affect Pfizer and the
status of the drug after it received market approval? What if Pfizer's
home country, the United States, applies the same logic it uses against
the ICC and refuses to recognize international pressure that might
hurt a significant economic actor? Would this scuttle the plan's deter-
rent effect? The short answer is no. If Pfizer lost market approval to
sell Trovan in other ICH members, such as the EU and Japan, this
would have a dramatic impact not only on overall sales of this particu-
lar drug, but also on the company's stock price.
A thorny social cost issue might arise if Trovan was the only drug
that could treat certain diseases and no adequate market substitute
existed after its removal. This Article will not go into the details of
addressing this problem, as this will be the focus of the second part of
this series. Briefly, that part proposes stripping intellectual property
mously been depicted in the John le Carr6 novel, The Constant Gardener, along with the corre-
sponding motion picture. See THE CONSTANT GARDENER (Focus Features 2005).
234. Sociologists describe the "Hawthorne Effect" as people changing their behavior when
they know that they are being watched. See ROBERT H. FLETCHER & SUZANNE W. FLETCHER,
CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY: THE ESSENTIALS 131 (4th ed. 2005).
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rights for the fruits of unethical drug testing under the TRIPS Agree-
ment of the WTO. The rationale for this particular proposal is to al-
low generic manufacturers to step into the fray to make the beneficial
drug so that society can benefit without enriching a violator of ethical
norms. However, generic drugs need to be evaluated for market ap-
proval as well, so this could cause a gap in the beneficial drug's availa-
bility. The solution to this problem could be a Hatch-Waxman-like
rule that would allow generic manufacturers to generate Abbreviated
NDA data, while the issue of stripping intellectual property rights for
Trovan was before the WTO hearing body. If the market determined
that Pfizer had a weak case before the WTO, then generic manufac-
turers would take the calculated risk of developing a generic version
of Trovan without knowing for certain that Pfizer might lose patent
protection. If the market determined that Pfizer had a strong case,
then they would likely not start developing a generic equivalent until
they knew the WTO's decision. In addition, if the United States still
upheld Trovan's patent rights domestically, generically manufactured
drugs from abroad could still depress Trovan's price through gray-
market imports. 235
This Article acknowledges that there will likely be strong opposi-
tion in some quarters to such a proposal. Some might argue that this
proposal unjustly seeks to punish past behavior, which in turn may
unfairly take away profits from those who think they are investing in a
company with a highly lucrative drug. However, the incentives cre-
ated by this proposal are clearly ex ante, as it provides a strong deter-
rent during the drug development process to unethical means, as they
can prove to be very costly. There is already a baseline international
ethical norm, the Declaration, which offers predictability as to what
standards a clinical drug trial must meet. Therefore, this proposal
clearly enables and creates a strong market incentive for large institu-
tional investors to conduct due diligence on a drug company's ethical
practices around the globe so that they can safeguard their invest-
ments. This type of market pressure alone, outside of any drug regu-
235. See Sabin Russell, New Crusade To Lower AIDS Drug Costs, S.F. CHRON., May 24, 1999,
at Al:
One of the best examples of this new front in the battle over AIDS drugs is South
Africa. where a recently enacted law would override pharmaceutical company patents
and allow "gray market" imports of cheap drugs from other countries.
Prescription drug prices vary dramatically from country to country, based on deals
cut by the manufacturer. The antibiotic Amoxicillin, for example, costs 50 cents a pill
in Johannesburg, 4 cents in Zimbabwe. The South African law would let the country
pursue the lowest cost drugs on the world market.
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latory agency action, should dramatically increase ethical compliance,
even in developing countries.
Another possible objection is that this proposal runs afoul of the
common law takings principle by depriving parties of valuable eco-
nomic and intellectual property rights.236 Under the principle of emi-
nent domain, if the government takes property because it is useful to
the public, the property holder must be compensated for this regula-
tory taking.237 However, in this proposal, the government is not tak-
ing these valuable rights from the owner because they are useful to
the public, but to protect human research subjects from ethical abuses.
In this sense, the protection of the public from ethical abuses is a valid
exercise of police power and thus not a regulatory taking.238
V. CONCLUSION
When human clinical trials are discussed in medical or pharmaceuti-
cal trade journals, numbers and statistics take on a vital role. How
large was the sample size being tested? What was the magnitude of
the measured effect? Was the measured effect statistically significant?
How much revenue can this drug expect to generate once it receives
market approval? What will be the effect on the company's stock
price? Lost in all of this focus on scientific and financial numbers is
the human factor. Those numbers are abstractions of events that have
real impact upon many individuals, families, and communities. The
degree of abstraction, or separation from the human factor, is even
greater when those being tested are largely invisible to the end users
of these drugs: impoverished, faceless, and voiceless masses whose
stories are not very important in richer societies. Although a larger
sample size translates into more robust statistical evidence, it also
translates into more human exposure to risky and unproven chemical
compounds. Also abstracted are the human decisionmakers in drug
corporations and institutional investment firms. Although large reve-
nue projections for a blockbuster drug can translate into a personal
windfall for clinical investigators, corporate executives, and investors,
it also represents the injustice of high-priced drugs not benefiting
those subjected to the risk of being test subjects.
The globalization of the pharmaceutical industry and clinical drug
testing is not inherently bad. Indeed, without this process, cures for
236. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, What Constitutes Taking of Property Requiring Com-
pensation Under Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment to United States Constitution-Supreme
Court Cases, 10 A.L.R. FED. 2d 231 (2006).
237. Id.
238. See id.
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seemingly intractable diseases like cancer or AIDS might not be possi-
ble in the near future. However, the real and potential benefits of-
fered by globalization in the drug industry do not mean that we have
to silently accept violations of ethical standards and the absence of
accountability and justice. Nobel-laureate economist Amartya Sen
has summarized her feelings as follows:
Even though I'm pro-globalization, I have to say thank God for the
anti-globalization movement. They're putting important issues on
the agenda .... My attitude to globalization is that one has to rec-
ognize first of all its inevitability, secondly its importance as an in-
tellectual, social, political force, even as an economic force, but
recognize that it can be very unjust and unfair and unequal, but
these are matters under our control.239
In other words, we are not powerless to control the actions of compa-
nies that test drugs on human subjects in developing nations. Nor
should we accept the powerlessness of human research subjects to
voice their concerns or to hold drug companies accountable for
breaches of ethical standards.
NGOs and international bodies such as the WHO must be more
creative in using their soft power to make sure that drug companies
and drug regulatory agencies are following the laws that bind them
within their own sovereign jurisdictions. Furthermore, these interna-
tional organizations must enable low-power human test subjects in de-
veloping countries to exert some agency in the event of ethical
239. Interview by David Barsamian with Amartya Sen (Sept. 2001), http://www.indiato-
gether.org/interviews/sen.htm#part2. Sen further opined on globalization critics generally:
What we have to look at is not a kind of wholesale denunciation of globalization, which
gets us nowhere. This is like King Kanute trying to discipline the sea. Quite aside from
the importance of globalization, it's inescapable. It's a question of how to make it more
humane and just. That requires paying attention to the underdog. I believe that virtu-
ally all the problems in the world come from inequality of one kind or another. And
what we're looking at is inequality. Globalization tends to benefit most people, but not
all. Some benefit greatly and others benefit relatively little. We have to see how we
can make it more equitable. That requires a great deal of attention being paid to par-
ticularly labor conditions. It requires much more activism by the labor movement. It
requires more reviving of cooperative attempts, and they have been successful in some
countries. Bangladesh is a good example. We need more of that. It requires revision
of the financial architecture of the world, because as it emerged in the 1940s it reflected
a reality which is no longer true. The Bretton Woods conference in 1944 set up the
IMF, the World Bank and and [sic] GAT. The WTO was the one late addition to that,
but basically it's the same architecture. In the 1940s, half of the world was colonial
territory. Most people were living in colonies. Democracy in the Third World was
unknown. Human rights wasn't an active issue. The prospect of rapid economic
growth for any poor country, especially in Asia, was unknown. The fact that people
could agitate for their rights and defend the environment and demand global equity
was unknown.
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breaches. The term globalization implies that we are all connected,
and, certainly in the area of clinical drug trials, citizens and corpora-
tions in developed nations directly benefit from the connection with
people in developing countries who serve as test subjects. However,
there needs to be more power flowing in the other direction, with test
subjects able to demand treatment with respect and to credibly
threaten drug companies with significant economic sanctions if their
rights are violated. The difficulty in legislating binding international
law and overcoming issues of consensus and sovereignty should not
lead us to assume the inevitability of injustice in the drug-testing
arena. Legal authority exists under current drug regulatory statutes in
the most lucrative economic markets to block approval of drugs that
were unethically tested.
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